Thanks for the reply. I think you’re right to stress the violence and coercion that sustains the link between imperialism, underdevelopment, and the global hierarchy of value capture is indeed central.
About your land as capital section, I want to add that if rent didn’t exist (economic rent, Ricardian rent, monopoly rents, political rents etc.), then capitalism would not lead to inequality. Competition would, in theory, balance returns to capital and wages, as reflected in Kaldor’s stylized facts. Land is unique in this context because its supply is fixed, so all land ownership inherently generates rents. By contrast, not all capital ownership results in rents, because competitive pressures can erode excess returns. I think, to speak the language of rents from a socialist perspective, your argument is that: “yes, but in a capitalist system, all of these rents are bound to happen (and increase over time), because the ones with money influence the rules that allow these rents (especially monopoly rents) either through misinforming voters or buying politicians”. I think both of us would agree with this - granted that we allow it to happen.
I think you’re right that our difference lies in what it means to stop this from happening. Both in terms of how do we do it, but also in what needs to be done. I would argue that the rents have increased from 70s to now in the US and many other western countries, but they also decreased from 30s to 50s and remained low for two more decades - and this change happened not through a revolution or seizing all companies. It happened democratically through the creation of a welfare state, through seizing some natural monopolies, unions, insurances, worker’s rights, and through public investment in innovation. These reforms show that systems can curb rentier dynamics without dismantling markets entirely.
I also argue that rent-seeking isn’t exclusive to capitalism. Socialist systems can face similar dynamics through regulatory capture, elite collusion, or state corruption. It’s not just a capitalism problem; it’s a human problem, and any system needs institutional checks to limit rent extraction. Looks like China’s share of wealth accruing to the top 10% has gone from around 42% in 1990s to around 68% in 2024 https://wid.world/country/china/.
Ultimately, I don’t think any system should be purely one or the other. Central planning has deep flaws, and so do unregulated markets. If we can maintain a democratic structure with a well-informed public, then we have a real chance to strike the right balance: limiting rents, promoting equity, and preserving freedom.
Maybe I just have a bit more faith that we can beat the capitalist forces by standing together and remain well-informed. Right now their strategy is to split us apart. In my view, people like you and I are on the same side, and if we push enough, we can win. I think taking a hard socialist stance might be counterproductive as many people don’t identify with this idea, making it harder for us to stand together. An idea could be to focus on reuniting, not under the banner of an ideology, but under the banner of the injustice we are subject to.
What you’re arguing here is Piketty’s accumulation view. Rognlie and Stiglitz have pretty convincing arguments against this. First, there is no such thing as a pure “worker” and a pure “capitalist”. Capitalists work and consume and workers save out of their wages (e.g. through pensions). Stiglitz argues “For the wealth–income ratio of capitalists to be ever increasing would require sr > g, but in standard Solow model of growth, where workers save at the same rate that capitalists do, that inequality does not hold in the long run.” “Secondly, the return to capital should be treated as endogenous. If the increase in wealth represented an increase in “capital,” then the law of diminishing returns would imply that the return to capital should have decreased.” - Stiglitz. Third, and most importantly, Stiglitz argues that when taking rents (what separates wealth from capital) out the equation, there is no measurable benefit for being an owner. He calls the capitalized value of rents, the “wealth residual”. He mainly focuses on rents caused by land ownership, market power, patents and assymmetric information. After all these rents are taken away, there is maybe one type of rent left that would make being a capitalist worthwhile for those who have a good idea/good understanding of markets - basically who is good at the labor of running a business. It is quasi-rents. They are always temporary, because they are the reward for having an idea and executing it until competition copies it. They are what are often extended through patents, a debatable policy. The temporarity of quasi-rents implies a necessity for a continuity of keeping innovation going, which becomes the labor of the capitalist. If all other rents than quasi-rents disappeared, the only benefit accruing to a capitalist would be the reward for the labor and knowledge required to come up with new products, production methods, etc and succeeding with it. And it challenges your statement “if there were no measurable benefit for being an owner, then everyone would be a worker.” because it would be similar to comparing two jobs.
Yes, a lot of these policies were inspired by socialist regimes. This does not prove that socialism is better, but if anything it implies that a mix of the two is better than pure capitalism.
These measures were certainly not sufficient solutions to the problem of rents, and in countries like the US, the institutions preventing politicians buying elections were not strong enough, if not non-existent. But these “temporary” measures have sustained in Scandinavia, where democracy is stronger.
Yes, without competition. But with competition, firms cannot pay less than the market salary without having a shortage of workers.
While this is true, wasn’t this also true for the US, when they had their main growth from 1945-78?
The main flaw is explained by complexity science. Society is a complex, self-organizing system composed of countless interacting agents, each with varying, dynamic, and unique preferences and constraints. As Hayek argues, such systems exhibit emergent order that cannot be planned or predicted in detail. Central planning assumes that outcomes can be engineered from above, but in reality, only general patterns—not specific results—can be anticipated. Just as evolutionary theory explains broad tendencies without predicting exact species, economic systems can only be understood through principles, not precise outcomes. Central planning fails because it attempts specific predictions in a domain where only qualitative ones are possible.
I never said socialism specifically is not democratic enough. I said that whatever system we have, we cannot trust those in power to act for the social good without proper institution-which there is no country in the history of the world that has perfected. The assumption that a democratically elected government will act in the public interest relies on both a perfect democracy and of altruistic public actors. In reality, there is both government and market failures. Buchanan showed that government actors are more interested in being reelected than improving outcomes for everyone, which are different incentives. A company buying a politician is a likely as a government agent providing benefits to groups they align with purely out of own self-interest. What matters most, whichever system we have, is designing the proper institutions to prevent these from happening. How would you decide who gets what in a socialist system? Under which ethical framework should this be decided? No matter which system you decide, there will be losers and winners. Will your choice depend on your own biases? If it is purely democratically chosen, what will happen to minorities?